We analyze assortative assignment games, introduced in Becker (1973) and Eriksson et al. (2000) . We study the extreme core points and show an easy way to compute them. We find a natural solution for these games. It coincides with several well-known point solutions, the median stable utility solution (Schwarz and Yenmez, 2011) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).We also analyze the behavior of the Shapley value. We finish with some extensions, where some hypotheses are relaxed.
Introduction
Several economic and other areas depend heavily on the allocation of indivisible resources, objects or persons. A simple but deeply analyzed problem is that of matching, by making valuable pairs, the elements of two finite sets. These are referred to hereafter as the agents' sets. An assignment matrix or array collects all these valuations.
There are at least two main issues to be addressed in any assignment problem. Firstly we have to search/look and analyze how agents sort themselves out, that is, who is matched with whom. Secondly we have to solve the assignment problem by proposing and studying fair allocations for the agents. Both aspects have been dealt with extensively. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) serves as an accurate well-written text at these issues and an up-todate survey is Núñez and Rafels (2015) .
Concurrent in time with the seminal paper of Shapley and Shubik (1972) , Becker (1973) shows up an original application of assignment problems to the marriage market in which households produce some output to share between man and woman. In some assignment problems he conveys the effect of mating of the likes.
To model the mating of the likes he introduces two independent conditions on the assignment matrix. First, the association of likes is optimal when traits are complements and second, each trait has a monotone effect on the output, higher values have a larger effect. Moreover he proposes and analyzes the core of the game as a decisive reference solution set for searching allocations to solve the assignment problem. In Becker's paper no explicit allocation is proposed.
In Chapter 10, Open questions and research directions, Roth and So-tomayor (1990) already expresses the aim of studying special classes of assignment problems "(...) of the kind explored by Becker (...)" (page 247).
Sherstyuk (1999) and Eriksson et al. (2000) manage to get insight into these topics. Sherstyuk analyzes multilateral supermodular assignment games.
She proves the non-emptiness of the core and finds some extreme core allocationsà la Shapley and Shubik. She imposes not only supermodularity but also monotonicity and opens a question about the possibility of relaxing the monotonicity condition, which we tackle in the last section of this paper. Once defined and established an easy closed formula in terms of the original entries of the assignment matrix, we devote our efforts to intertwine its main properties.
Firstly we show that Becker's solution always coincide with the median stable utility imputation introduced in Schwarz and Yenmez (2011). Secondly Becker's solution always coincides with the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969 ) of the assortative assignment game. This is a pleasant result since the nucleolus must be computed by tedious algorithms. Thirdly, we analyze the core and obtain an easy method to compute all extreme core points, and its number, a power of two.
To end the paper, we analyze which are the conditions for the Becker's solution to coincide with the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and also some extensions of the model to cover other assignment markets where our results can be applied.
Preliminaries
A bilateral assignment market (F, W, A) is formed by two non-empty disjoint sets, the set of firms F = {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m } and the set of workers W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n } where m could be different from n and a non-negative matrix A = (a ij ) (f i ,w j )∈F ×W ∈ M + m×n where each entry a ij represents some measure of the joint productivity of firm f i and worker w j when they are matched together. When m = n the assignment market is said to be square.
A matching µ from firms F to workers W is a bijection from
The set of all matchings is denoted by M (F, W) . Similarly we use M (S, T ) to represent all matchings from S ⊆ F to T ⊆ W.
We say firm f i and worker w j are matched by µ if w j = µ (f i ) or f i = µ −1 (w j ) . In this case we also say that each one is the partner by µ of the other one. With some abuse of notation we also write (f i , w j ) ∈ µ. When 1 |F | represents the cardinality of the set F.
dealing with indices we also use j = µ (i) or i = µ −1 (j) , if no confusion arises. When an agent does not have any partner by µ we say agent is unmatched.
A matching µ ∈ M (F, W) is optimal for the assignment market (F, W, A) if for any other matching µ we have
The set of all optimal matchings is denoted by M * A (F, W) . Shapley and Shubik (1972) associates any assignment market with a cooperative game 2 , the assignment game, where the set of players is F ∪ W and the characteristic function w A is defined for any ∅ = S ⊆ F and
where M(S, T ) is the set of matchings from S to T. Moreover w A (S ∪T ) = 0 if either S = ∅ or T = ∅.
Notice that any pair of firm and worker evaluates its worth by exactly the corresponding matrix entry, and any other coalition determines its worth by pairwise combinations its members can form.
The agents of an assignment market may divide among themselves their worth in any way they like. An imputation is a non-negative vector (x, y) ∈
, where we interpret x i and y j as the payoffs associated to firm f i and worker w j respectively. 2 In a cooperative game (N, v), the set of players is given by N = {1, . . . , n} and v is a function that assigns a real number v(S) for any coalition S ⊆ N with v(∅) = 0. Its core is defined as C(v) := {x ∈ R n | i∈N xi = v(N ) and for all S ⊆ N, i∈S xi ≥ v(S)}. A game is named balanced if its core is nonempty.
The core of the assignment game C (w A ) is described for any fixed µ ∈ M * A (F, W) as those imputations (x, y) ∈ R m + × R n + satisfying
Unassigned agents by µ receive a zero payoff in any core allocation.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) proves that the core of any assignment game is always nonempty. Among the core allocations of an assignment game, there are two specific extreme core points: the buyers-optimal core allocation (x A , y A ) where each buyer attains her maximum core payoff and each seller his minimum, and the sellers-optimal core allocation (x A , y A ) where each seller attains his maximum core payoff and each buyer her minimum.
In Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2011) an alternative characterization of the core is given. Let (F, W, A) be a square assignment market. Then the core is described as those imputations (x, y) ∈ R m + × R m + satisfying
Moreover, given two square assignment markets (F, W, A) and (F, W, B), their cores coincide C(w A ) = C(w B ) if and only if
3. Assortative assignments. Extreme core allocations
Assortative assignment markets were introduced by Becker (1973) . These markets model special bilateral assignment problems where agents on each side can be ordered by some trait with the consequence that the mating of the likes or a positive assortative mating will form. Assortativity is modeled by two monotonic effects with respect to the traits: the output effect and the increment of output effect.
An assignment market (F, W, A) is an assortative market if it satisfies: a) supermodularity 3 (the main diagonal is optimal in any 2 × 2 submarket):
b) monotonicity (non-decreasing rows and columns):
Matrix A is called assortative.
Only adjacent rows and adjacent columns are needed to check the supermodularity condition.
The class of assortative matrices is large enough. In fact, they form a full-dimensional convex cone in M + m×n (see Eriksson et al., 2000) . Let (F, W, A) be an assortative market with m ≤ n. From the supermodularity condition at least one optimal matching µ ∈ M (F, W) is monotone,
When the assortative assignment market is square, that is m = n, there is only one monotone matching which is placed in the main diagonal i.e. µ(f i ) = w i for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. This is, by the previous observation, optimal (maybe not unique). 3 Notice that this condition implies that matrix entries as function of the indices is supermodular in the lattice {1, . . . , m} × {1, . . . , n} with the usual order. When the reverse inequalities hold, it is called submodularity.
We will concentrate in the square case since any non-square assortative matrix with m < n could be analyzed by adding null rows at the beginning of the matrix. In this way we preserve supermodularity and the monotonicity conditions. Now we summarize some important and known results for any square assortative assignment game (F ∪ W, w A ) with A ∈ M + m .
(a) The main diagonal of the assignment matrix A is an optimal matching (maybe not unique).
(b) An allocation (x, y) ∈ R m + × R m + belongs to the core C(w A ) if and only if
(c) At any core allocation (x, y) ∈ C(w A ) we have
Items (a) and (b) depend only on the supermodularity condition of the assignment matrix, and a proof can be found in Martínez-de-Albéniz and Rafels (2014). Item (c) depends only on the monotonicity and the fact that we have an optimal matching in the main diagonal. It is known for assortative matrices (see Eriksson et al., 2000) . Now we give a new and simple procedure to obtain all the extreme core points. To this end, for notational convenience we introduce, for any square assortative assignment market (F, W, A) firm 0 and worker 0 and denote a 00 = a 01 = a 10 = 0.
A central path (a path) p is a sequence of different places or positions in
,
Notice that for any central path p and any k = 1, 2, . . . , m, either (k−1, k)
or (k, k−1) belongs to p but not both. Therefore there are 2 m different paths.
The set of all paths is denoted by P m .
A central path connects the initial position (0, 0) with the last one (m, m)
within the central strip. There are two important central paths, the one through the upper part of the strip:
and its symmetric path:
For each path p ∈ P m we associate an allocation vector, the p-vector
by solving the linear equations given by all the places of the selected path
. . , m, and (10)
where we take for notational convenience x 
, and in fact it is an extreme core point. We prove it by induction over m.
Firstly notice that if m = 1 there are only two different paths which vector is either (a 11 , 0) or (0, a 11 ). Assume that the solution is unique up to k, k > 1, and without loss of generality assume path p contains (k, k + 1).
Then by (10) and (11) we have
Simple manipulations yield, where we use the definition of assortative matrix, see (3) and (4),
From here we obtain the uniqueness of the solution (x p , y p ) and the fact that (x p , y p ) ∈ C(w A ).
Moreover (x p , y p ) is an extreme core point. To see it, just notice that if it were the midpoint of two other core points, these points must satisfy with equality all entries of path p. By uniqueness of the solution, they coincide with (x p , y p ).
We know that each central path gives an extreme core point. Let us write Ext(C(w A )) the set of all extreme core points. We prove next that any extreme core point is linked to a central path, that is, there is a correspondence between paths and extreme core points. This is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let (F, W, A) be a square assortative assignment market
Proof. See Appendix.
From the previous theorem there are at most 2 m different extreme core points. As the reader may suspect, different paths can give the same extreme
core point. Therefore to analyze this issue we introduce some additional notation.
Given an square assortative matrix A, we define its principal elements
Notice that each d A k , k = 2, . . . , m, corresponds to a consecutive 2 × 2 submarket centered at the main diagonal. The number of extreme core points is strongly related to the number of nonzero principal elements, n A , that is
Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let (F, W, A) be a square assortative assignment market
The proof is a direct consequence of the next lemma.
In the next lemma we analyze what happens with the allocation associated to a path when we move one and only one of its positions. In this way we realize whether this change implies an actual change in the allocation.
This fact allows to count the number of extreme core points.
Lemma 3.1 (Switching lemma). Let (F, W, A) be a square assortative assignment market with A ∈ M + m and let p ∈ P m be a central path through (i k * , j k * ) = (k * , k * − 1) for some k * ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Let p ∈ P m be the same path as p except we have switched
where (x p , y p ) and (x p , y p ) are defined in (10) and (11), and d A k * in (12) and (13).
Proof. We have to prove that the allocation defined in (14) satisfies equalities of path p . Since (x p , y p ) is associated with path p, the only equality we have to check is the corresponding to the position (k * − 1, k * ). Then for k * = 1,
It rests to analyze the proof of Theorem 3.2. Notice that only when in the switching lemma, Lemma 3.1, d A k * = 0 then the extreme core points corresponding to p and p coincide. Therefore each time a principal element vanishes, the initial potential number of 2 m extremes is divided by 2, which concludes the proof.
This switching lemma indicates that whenever we raise up a path, firms' sector is benefited, and consequently, workers' sector is harmed. Recall
Clearly whenever a path is modified downward, workers' sector is benefited. Then as a direct consequence of the switching lemma we have (x p * , y p * ) = (x A , y A ), where p * is the path given in (8), and path given in (9) is the path for the workers-optimal core allocation, i.e. (x p * , y p * ) = (x A , y A ).
Becker's solution
We want to show that a specific point solution has outstanding properties. We name it Becker's solution for assortative assignment markets. We define this solution and prove that it is a core point. 
We prove now that Becker's solution is a core element, i.e. B(A) ∈ C(w A ). To see that all components are non-negative, just observe that for
using the supermodularity and monotonicity of matrix A, see (3) and (4).
Similarly,
We prove the first ones and the others are proved similarly. For i = 1, . . . , m − 1, we have
where we have used the supermodularity. Now using (5)- (7) we obtain
We prove next that Becker's solution coincides with the median stable utility solution introduced by Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) and also it coincides with the nucleolus of the assignment game. Therefore we provide a nice formula for the nucleolus using only the matrix entries to compute it.
Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) define the median stable utility solution for assignment markets in the following way. Let (F, W, A) be an square assignment market with A ∈ M + m . This solution is the unique core allocation v median (A) = ( x, y) such that, for all f i ∈ F and for all w j ∈ W,
Here λ r is the Lebesgue measure in R r , where r = dim C(w A ), see Núñez and Rafels (2008). 
for any core allocation (x, y) ∈ C (w A ).
Llerena and Núñez (2011) prove that the nucleolus of a square assignment game ν(w A ) is characterized as the unique core allocation (x, y) ∈ C(w A ) such that for some optimal matching µ ∈ M * A (F, W)
4 Given a coalition S ⊆ N, and an allocation x ∈ R N the excess of a coalition is defined as e (S, x) := v (S) − i∈S xi. Note they can be considered as complaints. Proof. See Appendix.
Becker's solution and the Shapley value
The most popular single point solution for cooperative games is the Shap- is defined for all i ∈ N as
where |S| = s.
It is well-known that the Shapley value is usually outside the core for as- Becker's solution, and show that for square assortative assignment games, both solutions coincide only for some specific assortative matrices. This is our next theorem. 2. The Shapley value belongs to the core, Sh(w A ) ∈ C(w A ).
3. Matrix A is as follows:
Roughly speaking, this result shows that the Shapley value belongs to the core of an assortative assignment game only when the dominant diagonal property holds. Combined with the monotonicity, we obtain the special structure of the matrix.
Extensions
Now we introduce some extensions of the assortative market notion.
The first one contributes to relax the monotonicity condition (4). This possibility was also pointed out in Sherstyuk (1999). We name this concept weak-assortative and basically, apart from the supermodularity conditions, we request the monotonicity only on the central strip of the matrix.
Given an assignment market (F, W, A) where A ∈ M + m we say it is a weak-assortative market if it satisfies supermodularity condition (3) and an alternative condition to (4) , that is b') central strip monotonicity (entries of the central strip satisfy monotonicity):
with |i − j| ≤ 1 and |k − l| ≤ 1.
As the name suggests, weak-assortative is a proper extension of the assortative class of assignment markets. Nevertheless there is a kind of reverse implication. The core of any weak-assortative market equals the core of an assortative one. This is the essence to transfer the properties from assortative markets to weak-assortative ones. This result is constructive.
We introduce for any square matrix A ∈ M + m the matrix A ∈ M m defined by:
where the summation over an empty set of indices is zero. Notice that in general, entries a ij may be negative, but if matrix A is weak-assortative, then A ∈ M + m , since expression (22) can be written as:
Notice that matrices A and A have the same central strip. Proof. See Appendix.
As a consequence of the above theorem, we can apply to any weakassortative matrix, directly from its central strip our previous results for assortative matrices, that is, the extreme core points, Becker's solution, and its coincidence with the nucleolus 5 , etc.
Weak-assortative matrices open the possibility to look for a more general class of assignment matrices that can be solved and their core described using an appropriate assortative matrix. These matrices will be called assortative-
solvable.
Given an square assignment market (F, W, A) where A ∈ M + m we say it is assortative-solvable if there exists an square assortative matrix B ∈ M + m with the same core, that is C(w A ) = C(w B ).
Weak-assortative matrices are assortative-solvable, but there are another ones, as the next example shows. As an application we know that C(w A ) has exactly 2 n B = 8 extreme core allocations, the firms-optimal and workers-optimal core allocations are Notice that we have to use matrix B to obtain the extreme core allocations or Becker's solution. We cannot apply our methods directly to matrix A, since the central strip changes from matrix A to the assortative matrix B.
Two natural questions arise. Firstly how to know whether matrix A ∈ M + m is assortative-solvable and secondly how to find an associated assortative matrix. First of all, we fix an optimal matching on the main diagonal: the optimal partner of firm f k ∈ F is worker w k ∈ W.
Given a matrix A ∈ M + m with an optimal matching placed on the main diagonal, we introduce an auxiliary matrix
Notice that in (24) we subtract the worth of the market without the partners of firm f i and worker w j , that is, we drop out worker w i and firm f j . This matrix is the cornerstone for our characterization.
In the above Example 6.1 we can compute matrix H(A) : be the matrix defined in (24). Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. Matrix A is assortative-solvable.
Matrix H(A) is submodular and monotonic.
Moreover, in this case, an assortative matrix B ∈ M + m with the same core is given by
Notice that in Example 6.1 matrix B given by Theorem 6.2 does not coincide with the one in the example. This shows that an assortative-solvable matrix does not determine the assortative matrix which corresponds to it.
[5] Llerena, F., Núñez, M., 2011. A geometric characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game. Economics Bulletin 31(4), 3275-3285.
[6] Martínez-de-Albéniz, F.J., Núñez, M., Rafels, C., 2011. Assignment markets with the same core. Games and Economic Behavior 73(2), 553-563.
[ x k + y k+1 > a k k+1 and x k+1 + y k > a k+1 k . Notice that x k+1 > 0 since if
and define (x , y ) ∈ R F + × R W + by x t = x t and y t = y t , for t ≤ k, x t = x t + ε and y t = y t − ε, for t > k.
We have (x , y ) ∈ C(w A ) and (x , y ) = (x, y). Indeed it is enough to see
Similarly define (x , y ) ∈ R F + × R W + by
x t = x t and y t = y t , for t ≤ k, x t = x t − ε and y t = y t + ε, for t > k.
Then (x , y ) ∈ C(w A ) and (x , y ) = (x, y). Moreover (x, y) is the midpoint between (x , y ) and (x , y ), a contradiction with (x, y) being an extreme core point.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Consider p * , p * ∈ P m and denote (u, v) = 1 2 (x p * , y p * ) + (x p * , y p * ) . In order to prove the theorem we only need to check that B(A) = (u, v), since by Schwarz and Yenmez (2011) v median (A) = (u, v) for any square assortative assignment market.
Notice that for all k ∈ {2, . . . , m} position (k − 1, k) belongs to path p * and position (k, k − 1) to path p * . Then we have, for k = 2, . . . , m.
Solving the above linear equations we easily obtain
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. We first prove some technical results that Becker's solution B(A) = (x * , y * ) satisfies.
Notice first that for j = 2, . . . , m,
Lemma A.1 For all k ∈ {2, . . . , m} we have
For the first inequality of (A.2), just observe a 1 k ≥ a 1 1 ≥ 1 2 a 1 1 = x * 1 . For the rest of inequalities let j ∈ {2, . . . , k −1} and because of supermodularity, notice j < k, we have
Summing up and using (A.1) we get the desired result. Inequalities (A. 3) are left for the reader.
Lemma A.2 For all k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} we have
To prove (A.4), let j ∈ {k+2, . . . , m} and by supermodularity, notice j −1 > k, we have
Summing up and using (A.1) we get the desired result. The proof of (A.5) is similar.
Finally and from the expression of Becker's solution, is is easy to see that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} we have
(A.6) Let f r ∈ F and denote R = {f 1 , . . . , f r } ⊆ F. Let A R be the matrix A restricted to the first r rows and columns. Notice now that B(A R ) = (x * R , y * R ) ∈ R r + × R r + is just the restriction of B(A), and that B(A R ) ∈ C(w A R ). Now we prove B(A) is the nucleolus by induction over m. The case m = 1 is obvious. Assume the statement is true until r, r ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} and we prove it for r + 1. Denote by R1 = {1, . . . , r + 1} ⊆ F and A R1 matrix A restricted to the first r + 1 rows and columns.
Since matrix A is assortative, the main diagonal is an optimal matching µ. Then S stands for µ(S) and we must check that
We proceed through cases.
where i s = max {i | i ∈ S} , and we have used (A.2) with k = r + 1.
In the same way we obtain
Now we have two possibilities:
(a) i s = r. By induction hypothesis δ
S ,S (x * R , y * R ) and by (A.6) we have x * r + y * r+1 − a r r+1 = y * r + x * r+1 − a r+1 r and (A.7) holds.
(b) i s < r. Then i s +1 ≤ r, and by (A.5) taking k = i s we have x * is +y * r+1 − a is r+1 ≥ x * is + y * is+1 − a is is+1 . Now notice i s ∈ S, i s + 1 / ∈ S, and then
, and by the induction hypothesis (A.7) holds. 
Then (A.7) holds by (A.6).
Lastly Case 3:
where we have noticed first that R1 \ S = R \ S; we have x * r+1 ≥ x * r ≥ δ A R S, S (x * R , y * R ) and we have used (A.3) with k = r+1 and j t = max j | j ∈ R \ S . In the same way we obtain
(a) j t = r. By induction hypothesis δ
(x * R , y * R ) and by (A.6) we have x * r + y * r+1 − a r r+1 = y * r + x * r+1 − a r+1 r and (A.7) holds.
(b) j t < r. Then j t + 1 ≤ r, and by (A.4) taking k = j t we have x * r+1 + y * jt − a r+1 jt ≥ x * jt+1 + y * jt − a jt+1 jt . Now notice j t ∈ R \ S, j t + 1 / ∈ R \ S, and then x * r+1 + y * jt − a r+1 jt ≥ δ
value and the core satisfy the strong null property 7 . Proceed in the same way and the result is achieved.
3. −→ 1. It is a simple computation taking into account (A.8).
Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof. We show that matrix A given by (22) is assortative and C(w A ) = C(w A ). First notice that for any i, j such that |i − j| ≤ 1 we have a ij = a ij , that is, the central strip is the same in both matrices. It is easy to see that a ij + a i+1 j+1 = a i j+1 + a i+1 j for |i − j| ≥ 1. From here we conclude that the market (F, W, A) is supermodular.
We only have to show that a ij ≤ a kl for 1 Proof of Theorem 6.2
Proof. 1. −→ 2. Since A is assortative-solvable, there exists an assortative matrix B ∈ M + m such that C(w A ) = C(w B ). From here, since matrix A has an optimal matching in the main diagonal, it is clear that the main diagonal is also an optimal matching for matrix B and b kk = a kk for k = 1, 2, . . . , m.
We can assume, maybe by applying Theorem 6.1, that the entries of matrix B are given by (22). Now we claim, for all (f i , w j ) ∈ F × W,
(A.12)
Trivially (A.12) holds for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m. We discuss one case and the other case is proved similarly. For 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
Notice that to compute the last equality, matrix without row j and column i is a square assortative matrix and an optimal matching is placed in its main diagonal.
Expression (A.12) can be written as Notice first that for k = 1, 2, . . . , m, h A kk = a kk and then b kk = a kk . We prove that matrix B is assortative and C(w A ) = C(w B ).
First we prove the equality C(w A ) = C(w B ). Let it be (x, y) ∈ C(w A ).
We have, for all (f i , w j ) ∈ F × W, To see the reverse inclusion, let it be any (x, y) ∈ C(w B ). Then for all (f i , w j ) ∈ F × W, we have x i + y j ≥ b ij and using (A.16) we obtain x j + y i = (a jj − y j ) + (a ii − x i ) ≤ a ii + a jj − b ij = h Case (b) for 1 ≤ i = j ≤ m − 1 is immediate and case (c) for 1 ≤ j < i ≤ m is proved similarly to case (a).
